A necessary guide to Italy’s upcoming referendum, as Italian citizens will vote on whether to amend seven articles of the Constitution in the name of the so-called “separation of careers” for judges and prosecutors
On March 22 and 23, Italy will vote on what is being marketed as a mere restructuring of the judiciary. Citizens will decide whether to amend seven articles of the Constitution in the name of the so-called “separation of careers” for judges and prosecutors. But the issue is anything but technical.
With predictable rhetoric, the government presents the initiative as a long-overdue modernisation and correction of an allegedly outdated and flawed system. Yet constitutional surgery is never neutral, and it is certainly not undertaken in the abstract “interest of the people” it invokes. When the mechanisms that regulate magistrates’ careers, their impartiality, and their disciplinary accountability are simultaneously redesigned, the result is not an adjustment. It is a reconfiguration of power, eroding key foundations of the modern Italian state.
The Italian Constitution, drafted in the aftermath of the Second World War in the shadow of fascism, was conceived as a systematic break with both the monarchy and Mussolini’s authoritarian regime. Among the many principles that reshaped public life, one stood particularly clear: political majorities must not control those tasked with judging them. Judicial autonomy was never conceived as a corporatist privilege of an elitist caste. It was designed as a structural guarantee for citizens. A safeguard ensuring that legality can prevail even when it collides with the government of the day.
The reform promoted by Meloni’s government challenges that foundational settlement. It fragments the judiciary’s self-governing body, replaces internal elections with politically influenced selection mechanisms, transfers disciplinary authority to a newly created court, and reshapes defining institutional balances. All while insisting that independence will remain intact.
This referendum is not about administrative tidiness. It is about whether the judiciary will remain a counterweight to power, or become increasingly dependent on it.
What is the vote about?
The “separation of careers” is presented as the referendum’s flagship measure, almost as if it were the entire story. It is not. The vote seeks a reorganisation of the judiciary’s institutional architecture through a series of interconnected constitutional amendments.
A separation already exists. Magistrates are indeed allowed to switch between prosecutorial and judicial functions only once, and only within the first ten years of their career. If the objective were merely to reinforce that boundary, ordinary legislation would have sufficed. A constitutional overhaul would not have been necessary.
Instead, the proposed reform constitutionalises a rigid and irreversible divide. Judges and prosecutors would no longer belong to the same constitutional organ. Two separate self-governing bodies would replace the current High Council of the Judiciary: one for judges, the other for prosecutors.
The restructuring goes even further. Both Councils would lose one of their most sensitive and consequential powers: disciplinary self-governance. That role would be transferred to a newly created external High Disciplinary Court composed of lay members and magistrates drawn from those who exercise, or have exercised, functions at the Supreme Court of Cassation. Its decisions would not be subject to appeal before the Court of Cassation itself, marking a significant departure from the general constitutional principle of review.
Here the actual scope of the referendum unfolds, as representation would also change radically. Magistrates would no longer elect their members to the Councils or to the Disciplinary Court. Instead, members would be selected by lot. Lay members, in turn, would be chosen from lists approved by Parliament.
Since opposing voices cannot even agree on the very nature of the referendum question, the already disengaged electorate is left confused. Reformist enthusiasts insist that greater judicial objectivity is needed. The left-leaning current of the judiciary, cast as the primary enemy of Meloni’s autocratic vision of the state à la Trump or Orbán, would no longer be an obstacle, neutralised through political intermediation.
The “No” Committee counters that fragmenting a constitutional organ into multiple structures inevitably weakens its institutional weight. Removing electoral legitimacy relocates disciplinary authority outside the traditional framework of self-government. In doing so, the careful balance between legislative and executive powers envisioned by the Constitution’s founding fathers is deliberately dismantled.
This is the concrete substance of the referendum: a structural redesign of governance, accountability, and representation within the judiciary.
How the referendum came to life
If the referendum question is already contentious, the method through which it is being pursued is equally controversial and alarmingly revealing of the dirty game of Italian politics.
Constitutional changes of this magnitude would normally require careful public and institutional debate. Instead, the call to the polls was approved in Parliament without meaningful discussion or consideration of amendments. The government imposed a sealed process, deliberately excluding negotiation. This procedural rigidity exposes how Meloni’s coalition perceives the judiciary as a threat to its authority.
The clearest insight into the underlying intention comes from Minister of Justice Carlo Nordio. Remarkable, for instance, was his suggestion that Democratic Party leader Elly Schlein should recognise how these changes could equally benefit a future left-wing government, should she become Prime Minister. Days later, the same Minister described the High Council of the Judiciary as “para-mafioso” (mafia-like). It remains unclear whether the government seeks to eradicate or institutionalise such elements.
Further concerns arise from the broader institutional climate. Recently, during an ordinary plenary session of the High Council of the Judiciary, President of the Republic Sergio Mattarella intervened publicly for the first time in eleven years, urging all institutions to respect one another’s constitutional roles “in the interest of the Republic.” Yet government figures immediately resumed their attacks on judicial decisions, portraying them as illegitimate intrusions into the political sphere and fueling manipulative narratives.
If anything, the debate has increasingly detached itself from its original substance. It now escalates around denunciations of an allegedly obstructionist judiciary. Citizens are told a “Yes” victory will deliver a more efficient and equitable justice system, conveniently omitting how it entrenches a ruling class that, following Berlusconi’s legacy, has a long history of judicial battles.
Beyond the reform
What makes this vote crucial and worthy of attention is the political culture it reflects. A democracy should not fear its institutions. It should not frame constitutional counter-powers as enemies to be disciplined. Yet this seems too much to ask. The message that has dominated recent months is that judicial independence is tolerable only as long as it does not interfere with executive power.
Once the idea that the judiciary must be aligned with political institutions takes hold, democratic equilibrium erodes quietly, incrementally, almost imperceptibly. It does not collapse dramatically. It normalises. Constitutional changes shape the long-term distribution of power; they are not branding exercises. They redefine who controls whom.
As the referendum approaches, the projected outcome remains uncertain. That makes active engagement essential. Will the Italian electorate stand up against Meloni’s vision of an autocratic state, where the judiciary bows to power rather than regulates it?
Stand up. Read. Decide. The stakes are Italy’s democracy itself.
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